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AGENCY FEES IN EDUCATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT: REALITY OR MIRAGE?
Joseph G. Schumb, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
In 1976, the Educational Employment Relations Act, com-
monly known as the Rodda Act or EERA,1 became effective in
California, replacing the Winton Act,2 which had been severely
critLized for not providing an effective means of conducting
employer-employee relations.3 For the first time, employees of
the California public schools, including the community col-
leges, can select their own exclusive representative who has the
authority to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with
the school district employer on their behalf.
The Rodda Act is patterned after the National Labor Rela-
tions Act' (NLRA). It established an administrative agency
formerly known as the Educational Employment Relations
Board and now called the Public Employment Relations Board
[PERB], 5 which has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
appropriate units, conduct elections, and certify exclusive rep-
resentatives.6 The Act makes certain conduct of the employer
and employee organization an unfair practice and gives PERB
the authority to hear and determine unfair practice charges.
The Act also authorizes the inclusion of provisions for or-
ganizational security in collective bargaining agreements This
article will explore the legality of organizational security ar-
rangements, specifically the enforceability of the agency or
service fee under California law and the recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court upholding agency fees in the
public sector.' It is the author's conclusion that although such
* A.B., 1951, Brown University; LL.B., 1954, Harvard Law School; Member,
California Bar.
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3540-3549 (West Supp. 1978).
2. 1965 Cal. Stats., ch. 2041, § 2, at 4660 (repealed 1975).
3. Comment, Collective Bargaining and the California Public Teacher, 21 STAN.
L. REv. 340 (1969).
4. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., EERB Decision No. 5, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder) 1 PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. CAL. (LRP) 355 (Nov. 24, 1976).
5. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3513(g), 3540 (West Supp. 1978).
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541.3 (West Supp. 1978).
7. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3540.1(i) (West Supp. 1978).
8. Abood v. Board of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). An agency fee is an arrangement
which provides that "as a condition of employment for the duration of the contract,
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agency fees have been held legal, the problems in determining
the amount of fees which may be properly charged to non-
members and in collecting them weaken their effectiveness as
a method of providing union security. Although this article will
deal primarily with the agency fee as applied to public school
teachers in California, many comments will apply generally to
all public employees covered by similar laws elsewhere.
Organizational security is obviously a matter of great con-
cern to employee organizations because it provides needed rev-
enue and eliminates "free riders," those employees who obtain
the benefits of the union's representation without financially
supporting the union.' The Rodda Act provides for two forms
of organizational security. 0 First, the statute permits a mainte-
nance of membership provision which specifies that an em-
ployee who is a member of the union when the collective bar-
gaining agreement is signed or becomes a member thereafter
must "maintain his membership in good standing for the dura-
tion of the written agreement."" Second, the law authorizes an
agency or service fee which permits the exclusive representa-
tive to charge non-members a fee "not to exceed the standard
initiation fee, periodic dues, and general assessments" levied
on members. 2 To be effective the organizational security provi-
an employee is required to pay a fixed sum every month to defray union costs whether
or not he is a member of the union." Hopfl, The Agency Shop Question, 49 CORNELL
L. REv. 478, 480 (1964). Similar to the agency fee is a "fair share" agreement according
to which the employee is free to not join the union, but must pay a pro rata share of
the cost of representation. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 243.650 (1977-1978).
9. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 761 (1961).
10. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3540.1(i) (West Supp. 1978).
11. Id. § 3540.1(i)(1). This section authorizes:
An arrangement pursuant to which a public school employee may decide
whether or not to join an employee organization, but which requires him,
as a condition of continued employment, if he does join, to maintain his
membership in good standing for the duration of the written agreement.
However, no such arrangement shall deprive the employee of the right to
terminate his obligation to the employee organization within a period of
30 days following the expiration of a written agreement . ...
12. Id. § 3540.1(i)(2), which provides for
An arrangement that requires an employee, as a condition of continued
employment, either to join the recognized or certified employee organiza-
tion, or to pay the organization a service fee, periodic dues, and general
assessments of such organization for the duration of the agreement, or a
period of three years from the effective date of such agreement, whichever
comes first.
State employees who have been brought under the jurisdiction of the PERB are
not covered by EERA, and the organizational security provisions of section 3540.1(i)
are not applicable to them. Recent amendments only authorize a maintenance of
membership provision. CAL. GOV'T CODE' § 3513(h) (West Supp. 1978).
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sion must be agreed to by the employer and included in the
collective bargaining agreement. 3
The widespread use of the agency fee is a rather recent
development. Prior to 1935 and the adoption of the National
Labor Relations Act, there was no limitation on the right to
bargain for union security under federal law and hence more
restrictive forms of union organization such as the union shop
and closed shop were legal.' With the adoption of the National
Labor Relations Act, 5 the right to negotiate union security
provisions remained so long as the union was not company
dominated and represented a majority of the members in an
appropriate unit."
In 1947, Congress passed the Labor Management Act
which amended section 7 of the Wagner Act and guaranteed
the right of employees to refrain from union activities," but
permitted provisions for union shop and maintenance of mem-
bership arrangements in collective bargaining agreements. 8 Of
course, any such arrangements required the agreement of the
employer, which was not always forthcoming because of the
reluctance to force non-members to join the union. The agency
shop became used increasingly as a compromise provision be-
cause it did not require non-members to join the union, but did
require them to pay their share of the costs of union activities.'
Since the law imposed upon the exclusive representative the
duty to represent all members of the unit whether union mem-
bers or not,10 it was reasonable to argue that they should pay
their "fair share."2'
The Labor Management Act amendments did not mention
the agency shop as a permissible form of union security, and
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3546(a) (West Supp. 1978).
14. In a closed shop the employer agrees to hire only union members, and further
agrees that all employees will continue to be union members as a condition of employ-
ment. A union shop differs only in that the employer may hire non-union persons, but
within a specified period the employee must become a member. Blair, Union Security
Agreement in Public Employment, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 183, 185 (1975).
15. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970).
16. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
17. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
18. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
19. Hopfl, The Agency Shop Question, 49 CORNELL L. REv. 478, 480 (1964).
20. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945); Wallace Corp. v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944). See also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3544.9 (West Supp. 1978).
21. Hopfl, supra note 19, at 480. Some state laws specifically refer to "fair share"
agreements. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.61 (West Supp. 1978); OR. REv. STAT.§§ 243.650, 292.055 (1977-1978); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.81(6) (West 1974).
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therefore its legality under the NLRA was in doubt" until 1963,
when the Supreme Court held it was lawful in NLRB v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp. 3 In upholding the agency shop, the Supreme
Court pointed out that the distinction between an agency shop
and a union shop, which was specifically authorized by the
NLRA, was "more formal than real" because the union shop
is enforceable only to the extent that it requires the payment
of dues and fees. The Court said "[lt is permissible to condi-
tion employment upon membership, but membership, insofar
as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be
conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues.""
Prior to the decision in General Motors the Supreme Court
had upheld against constitutional attack a provision of another
federal law, the Railway Labor Act, which specifically author-
ized the agency shop in the private sector. 5 The question
whether public employees could be compelled under our fed-
eral constitution to pay an agency or service fee remained an
open question until last year. 6
22. General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 481, 47 L.R.R.M. 1306 (1961), in which
the NLRB initially held the agency shop unlawful.
23. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
24. Id. at 742.
25. Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
26. Abood v. Board of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The constitutional provisions
discussed in this article deal with the United States Constitution. Whether public
employees can be compelled to pay an agency fee under state law will not be discussed
in detail in this article. Although there is no California case to uphold the imposition
of agency fees in the public sector, it is well established in the private sector that a
closed shop is legal and a proper objective of union activity. See Parkinson Co. v.
Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 P. 1027 (1908); McKay v. Retail Auto
Salemen's Local Union, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 106 P.2d 3 (1940); C.S. Smith Metropolitan
Mkt. Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal. 2d 389, 106 P.2d 414 (1940). One California Supreme Court
case held against a claim of constitutional violation when a union member was com-
pelled to pay a special assessment to defray the cost of an "educational" program to
oppose an initiative designed to outlaw the union shop which he supported. DeMille
v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied,
333 U.S. 876 (1948). And, although under California law public employees have no
common law right to bargain collectively, or to contract for an agency shop in the ab-
sence of statutory authority to do so, it does not appear that once the right is statu-
torily granted that it would be unconstitutional. City of Hayward v. United Pub. Em-
ployees, 54 Cal. App. 3d 761, 126 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1976). Other public employees in
California are seeking agency fee type agreements. See 34 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE RE-
LATIONS 2 (Sept. 1977). Since Abood was decided, a federal district court has upheld
on its face Hawaiian legislation which requires non-members to pay a service fee.
Jensen v. Yonamine, 437 F. Supp. 368 (D. Hawaii 1977).
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THE LEGALITY OF AGENCY FEES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR-ABOOD
AND ITS PRECEDENTS
In May, 1977, the United States Supreme Court held in
A bood v. Board of Education that it was constitutionally per-
missible to charge public employees an agency fee to the extent
that it was used to defray the costs of collective bargaining. The
Court held, Mr. Justice Stewart writing the opinion, that an
agency fee equal to the amount of regular fees and dues of
members of the union was permissible, but that objecting non-
members were entitled to a refund of any portion of the fee that
was used for political or ideological purposes.2 1 Justices
Rehnquist and Stevens wrote separate concurring opinions,
and Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Blackmun, concurred in the judgment insofar as it held that a
state cannot constitutionally compel public employees to con-
tribute to union political activities which they oppose. From
the remainder of the decision they dissented.
In Abood, the Supreme Court had before it a Michigan
statute which provided in relevant part as follows:
[Niothing in this act or in any law of this state shall
preclude a public employer from making an agreement
with an exclusive bargaining representative. . . to require
as a condition of employment that all employees in the
bargaining unit pay to the exclusive representative a serv-
ice fee equivalent to the amount of dues uniformly required
of members of the exclusive bargaining representative
29
In the state court, teachers sought declaratory relief chal-
lenging the constitutionality of this provision and alleged that
they had been threatened with dismissal.'" The Michigan
Court of Appeals interpreted the statute as not limiting "the
non-member's contribution to his proportionate share of the
costs of collective bargaining," and concluded that "it is clear
that the amendment sanctions the use of non-member's fees for
purposes other than collective bargaining."'"
On the authority of International Association of Machin-
ists v. Street,2 the Michigan Court held that the statute "could
27. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
28. Id. at 232-42.
29. 431 U.S. at 214 n.7, quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 432.210(1)(c) (1978).
30. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 230 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
31. Id. at 326.
32. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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violate plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights",,
but denied relief on the ground that Street had held that reme-
dies need only be granted to employees "who have rhade known
to the union officials that they do not lesire their funds to be
used for political causes to which they object."3 Since there
was no specific allegation in the complaint that plaintiffs had
protested the expenditure of funds for political purposes to
which they objected, plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief.
If such an allegation were made, the appropriate relief would
have been "restitution to the employee of that portion of his
money expended by the union over his objection."
The case reached the Supreme Court on the pleadings, and
because it was not tried on the merits, there was no evidence
of any particular expenditures. However, it is clear that the
complaint alleged that the union used, or would use, a substan-
tial part of these funds for "various social activities for the
benefit of its members which are not available to non-members
as a matter of right" and to support various "activities and
programs which are economic, political, professional, scien-
tific, and religious" which plaintiffs did not approve and which
were not related to collective bargaining activities.6
The Private Sector Precedents
In upholding the agency fee as applied to public employ-
ees, Justice Stewart relied on two earlier decisions of the Court
which he quite correctly concluded "on their face go far to-
wards resolving" the issues raised.37 In the first case, Railway
Employees' Dept. v. Hanson,38 the Court held that a union
shop provision in a collective bargaining agreement authorized
by the Railway Labor Act 39 was constitutional and rejected the
challenge of employee non-members who did not desire to join
the union and who sought to enjoin the application and en-
forcement of such an agreement. In Hanson, the Nebraska
Supreme Court had held that the union shop agreement vio-
lated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
because it deprived the employees of their freedom of associa-
33. 230 N.W.2d at 327.
34. Id. (quoting 367 U.S. at 774).
35. 230 N.W.2d at 327.
36. 431 U.S. at 212-13.
37. Id. at 217.
38. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
39. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
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tion and violated the Fifth Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, stating "that the requirement for fi-
nancial support of the collective bargaining agency by all who
receive the benefits of its work is within the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause and does n6t violate either the
First or the Fifth Amendments."40 Emphasizing that the Rail-
way Labor Act, as construed, limited the required financial
support to only payment of periodic dues, initiation fees, and
assessments for purposes germane to collective bargaining,
Justice Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court, said:
To require, rather than to induce, the beneficiaries of trade
unionism to contribute to its costs may not be the wisest
course. But Congress might well believe that it would help
insure the right to work in and along the arteries of inter-
state commerce. No more has been attempted here. The
only conditions to union membership authorized by § 2,
Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act are the payment of
"periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments." The as-
sessments that may be lawfully imposed do not include
"fines and penalties." The financial support required re-
lated, therefore, to the work of the union in the realm of
collective bargaining. No more precise allocation of union
overhead to individual members seems to us to be neces-
sary. The prohibition of "fines and penalties" precludes
the imposition of financial burdens for disciplinary pur-
poses. If "assessments" are in fact imposed for purposes
not germane to collective bargaining, a different problem
would be presented.'
Thus, in Hanson the Supreme Court dealt only with the
question whether non-members could be constitutionally com-
pelled to pay the costs of collective bargaining. However, the
Court did not define what it meant by the "costs of collective
bargaining."
In the other case relied on by Justice Stewart,
International Association of Machinists v. Street,42 the Court
was faced with whether employees could be compelled to con-
tribute to the cost of political campaigns of candidates whom
they opposed and to promote political and economic ideologies
with which they disagreed. The Court held that when the Rail-
way Labor Act was properly construed, it authorized only the
40. 351 U.S. at 238.
41. Id. at 235.
42. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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recovery from non-members ofexpenditures relating to collec-
tive bargaining and adjusting grievances and denied authority
to a union, over the employee's objection, to spend his money
for political causes which he opposes.43 Accordingly, the impo-
sition of a compulsory agency fee to be used for political pur-
poses over the objection of non-members violated the Act.
Thus, the Court avoided the constitutional issue.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, detailed the history
of labor legislation in the railroad industry and specifically the
arguments made by the unions in 1950 to support the amend-
ment authorizing the union shop. The principal argument, he
concluded, was that the cost of collective bargaining and ad-
ministering collective bargaining agreements should be spread
"to all employees who benefited," thus eliminating the 'free
riders'-those employees who obtained the benefits of the un-
ions' participation in the machinery of the [Railway Labor]
act without financially supporting the unions."" The Court
again did not attempt to delineate the precise limits of permis-
sible expenditures, but said:
We respect this congressional purpose when we construe
§ 2, Eleventh as not vesting the unions unlimited power to
spend exacted money. We are not called upon to delineate
the precise limits of that power in this case. We have before
us only the question whether the power is restricted to the
extent of denying the unions the right, over the employee's
objection, to use his money to support political programs
which he opposes. Its use to support candidates for public
office, and advance political programs is not a use which
helps defray the expenses of the negotiation or administra-
tion of collective agreements, or the expenses entailed in
the adjustment of grievances and disputes. In other words,
it is a use which falls clearly outside the reasons advanced
by the unions and accepted by Congress why authority to
make union-shop agreements was justified. On the other
hand, it is equally clear that it is a use to support activities
within the area of dissenters' interests which Congress en-
acted the proviso to protect. We give § 2, Eleventh, the
construction which achieves both congressional purposes
when we hold, as we do, that § 2, Eleventh, is to be con-
strued to deny the unions, over an employee's objection,
the power to use his exacted funds to support political
causes which he opposes.
43. Id. at 768-69.
44. Id. at 761.
[Vol. 18916
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We express no view as to other union expenditures
objected to by an employee and not made to meet the costs
of negotiation and administration of collective agreements,
or the adjustment and settlement of grievances and dis-
putes.45
Since the Court held that fees were used for purposes not
authorized by law, it had to decide on the appropriate remedy.
The Court held that an injunction restraining the enforcement
of the union-shop agreement was plainly not appropriate be-
cause the agreement itself was not unlawful. The non-
members' grievance stemmed not from the agreement but from
the spending of their funds for purposes not authorized by the
Railway Labor Act in the face of their objection, not from the
enforcement of the union-shop agreement by the mere collec-
tion of funds.4" The Court concluded that if their money were
used for the purposes contemplated by the Act, the appellees
would have no grievance at all.
Furthermore, the Court maintained that restraining the
collection of any funds from the non-members might interfere
with the union's duty of representation and that forbidding all
expenditures for the political purposes objected to might vio-
late the first amendment rights of the majority. Any remedies
should be granted only "to employees who have made known
to the union officials that they do not desire their funds to be
used for political causes to which they object . . . .[D]issent
is not to be presumed-it must affirmatively be made known
to the union by the dissenting employees."47 The Court then
suggested a remedy, stating:
One remedy would be an injunction against expenditure
for political causes opposed by each complaining employee
of a sum, from those monies to be spent by the union for
political purposes which is so much of the monies exacted
from him as is the proportion of the union's total budget.
The union should not be in a position to make up such sum
from money paid by a nondissenter, for this would shift a
disproportionate share of the costs of collective bargaining
to the dissenter and have the same effect of applying his
money to support such political activities. A second rem-
edy would be restitution to each individual employee of
that portion of his money which the union expended, de-
45. Id. at 768-69.
46. Id. at 771.
47. Id. at 774.
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spite his notification, for the political causes to which he
had advised the union he was opposed. There should be no
necessity, however, for the employee to trace his money up
to and including its expenditure; if the money goes into
general funds and no separate accounts of receipts and
expenditures of the funds of individual employees are
maintained, the portion of his money the employee would
be entitled to recover would be in the same proportion that
the expenditures for political purposes which he had ad-
vised the union he disapproved bore to the total union
budget.5
In Railway Clerks v. Allen,4" the Supreme Court amplified
Street, stating that the lower court would have to determine (1)
the expenditures disclosed by the record which are political
and (2) the percentage of total union expenditures which are
for political expenditures. The burden of proving these matters
was placed on the union.
Abood -- A Plurality Decision
These cases provided the underpinning for Abood, in
which Justice Stewart initially recognized the strong public
interest in promoting collective bargaining through an exclu-
sive bargaining agent. The existence of a single representative
promotes more efficient and effective bargaining relationships
by reducing interunion rivalries and conflicting union de-
mands. It also avoids negotiating more than one contract to
cover the same unit. Justice Stewart, relying on often repeated
arguments, pointed to the cost and expense of collective bar-
gaining and representation duties as well as the existence of the
union's duty to represent all employees in the unit whether or
not they are union members.
He acknowledged, however, that requiring involuntary
support of the collective bargaining representative has an im-
pact on first amendment rights. Nevertheless, he concluded
that Hanson and Street had already decided that "such inter-
ference as exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative
assessment of the important contribution of the union shops to
the system of labor relations established by Congress. ' 51
48. Id. at 774.75.
49. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
50. Cf. Comment, Collective Bargaining and the California Public Teacher, 21
STAN. L. REV. 340 (1969) (substantial numerical disparity in membership of different
unions, caused representative selection to increase interunion rivalry).
51. 431 U.S. at 222.
918 [Vol. 18
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Justice Stewart then reviewed the Michigan scheme for
regulating public sector labor relations and found that it was
directed at "no different kinds of evil" and that "the desirabil-
ity of labor peace is no less important in the public sector, nor
is the risk of free riders any smaller."5 He concluded that
Hanson and Street appear to require the Court to validate the
agency shop in the public sector "insofar as the service charge
is used to finance expenditures by the union for the purposes
of collective bargaining, contract administration, and griev-
ance adjustment . . .53
Justice Stewart rejected two arguments advanced by non-
member employees to distinguish Hanson and Street. First,
they argued that in public employment constitutional guaran-
tees are more directly implicated. Second, they contended that
collective bargaining in the public sector is inherently political
and prohibition against forced political association is a funda-
mental constitutional right. The Court acknowledged that the
actions of public employers are state action, but said that
plaintiffs claims failed in Hanson not for lack of state action
but rather for lack of a constitutional violation. While noting
differences between the public and private sector, the Court
found that the uniqueness was not in the employees, but rather
in the employer and, in any event, that the difference did "not
translate into differences in First Amendment rights.""4 The
Court concluded that the union was prohibited "from requiring
any of the appellants to contribute to the support of an ideolog-
ical cause he may oppose as a condition of holding a job as a
public school teacher,"55 and that employees cannot be coerced
into financing ideas they oppose "by the threat of loss of gov-
ernmental employment.""
The Court recognized that there would be "difficult prob-
lems in drawing lines between collective bargaining activities,
for which contributions may be compelled, and ideological ac-
tivities unrelated to collective bargaining . . .," and that the
line would be "somewhat hazier" in the public sector because
approval of a legislative body may be involved in order to effec-
tuate the collective bargaining agreement.57 Nevertheless the
Court refused to define the dividing line because the case came
52. Id. at 224.
53. Id. at 225.
54. Id. at 232.
55. Id. at 235.
56. Id. at 236.
57. Id.
1978]
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before it on the pleadings and lacked the "factual concrete-
ness" necessary to make such a decision. The Court reaffirmed
the remedies suggested in Street and approved in Allen, but
indicated that it would be highly desirable for unions to de-
velop a voluntary plan to allow non-members to object to and
be relieved of that portion of the service charge which is ex-
pended for political purposes. In that manner, a dissenting
employee could object to that portion of the agency fee spent
"for activities or causes of a political nature or involving con-
troversial issues of public importance only incidentally related
to wages, hours, and conditions of employment."" The em-
ployee would be entitled to a refund of his service charge in an
amount equal to the proportion that the cost of the specified
purpose bears to total union expenses. The union would then
refund that portion of his service charge, and its calculations
would be subject to review by an impartial board. 9
Since the Michigan appellate court had denied relief be-
cause the employee had not specified the particular expense to
which he objected, the Supreme Court reversed, relying on
Allen, holding that a cause of action was stated and that it was
sufficient that plaintiffs alleged they opposed ideological ex-
penditures of any kind without any greater specificity. The
Court said that to compel an employee to disclose his own
beliefs more specifically would itself place an unreasonable
burden on the employee's first amendment rights.
Only three other justices joined in the opinion of Justice
Stewart. Justices Stevens and Rehnquist concurred. Justice
Stevens stated his understanding that the opinion of the Court
did not preclude a requirement that the union establish a pro-
cedure to insure that funds of dissenters will not be used even
"temporarily" to finance ideological activities unrelated to
collective bargaining before requiring any service fee to be
charged dissenters. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment
only and was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Black-
mun. In his view,
the Court apparently rules that public employees can be
compelled by the State to pay full union dues to a union
with which they disagree, subject only to a possible rebate
or deduction if they are willing to step forward, declare
their opposition to the union, and initiate a proceeding to
58. Id. at 240 n.41.
59. The Court was careful to point out that it expressed no view on the constitu-
tional sufficiency of the procedure. Id. at 242 n.45.
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establish that some portion of their dnes has been spent on
"ideological activities unrelated to collective bargain-ing. 1°
Justice Powell concluded that even expenditures for collective
bargaining purposes would be objectionable if there were a suf-
ficient degree of ideological protest from the employees and the
public at large. He suggested that the case should be remanded
for trial to require the state to demonstrate that each particular
expenditure was necessary to serve an overriding governmental
objective.
The decision of the plurality attempts to balance the com-
mands of the first amendment rights of association and speech
with the governmental interest in advancing labor peace and
stability through the collective bargaining process and, more
specifically, insuring a viable and effective labor organization
supported by all of the persons who benefit from its activities.
The opinion of Justice Stewart and the decision of the Court
is consistent with and follows from the earlier decisions in
Hanson, Street, and Allen. It provides a reasoned and rational
resolution to accommodating a strong public policy with a con-
stitutional mandate. It permits the union to maintain its fi-
nancial basis and yet protects the rights of dissenters. Permit-
ting the union to collect the entire fee in the first instance is
not unreasonable since the dissenter merely has to make a
general objection and the burden falls on the union to justify
the charge."
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE
UNION EXPENDITURES - AN UNMARKED BOUNDARY
Precisely what constitutes a proper use of the service fee
is an important issue left unresolved by Abood. It is clear that
expenditures for political and "ideological activities unrelated
to collective bargaining" are improper.2 It is equally clear that
expenditures for the cost of "exclusive union representation"'"
and for "the purposes of collective bargaining, contract admin-
istration and grievance adjustment" are proper. 4 This leaves
60. Id. at 245.
61. Cf. Lathop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (Court did not decide constitu-
tionality of compulsory support of objected to activities of the integrated state bar)
(cited at 431 U.S. at 233 n.29).
62. 431 U.S. at 236.
63. Id. at 229.
64. Id. at 225-26.
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in doubt expenditures for political or ideological purposes re-
lated to collective bargaining and representation and all other
expenditures which fall into none of these categories.
The opinion in A bood and its predecessors have been dis-
cussed at some length because Justice Stewart's opinion was
joined in by only three other justices and the earlier decisions
may be of some guidance in drawing the proper line between
permissible and impermissible expenditures. In Hanson, Jus-
tice Douglas said expenses "not germane to collective bargain-
ing" would present "a different problem."" In Street, Justice
Brennan said unions did not have unlimited power to spend
exacted money, but only decided that funds could not be used
over a dissenter's objection to "political causes" and specifi-
cally stated "no view" as to other union expenditures. " In
Abood, the Court held that an employee could not be com-
pelled to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he
may oppose. " It would appear then that since the basis for
denying the union power to spend the entire service fee in any
fashion it deems proper to meet its objectives is the forced
contribution to support political or ideological activities"
which non-members oppose, that only those expenditures that
are for purposes unrelated to collective bargaining should be
proscribed.
The primary objective of a labor organization is to advance
the economic interests of the persons it represents in relation
to their employment. In reaching that objective the use of the
political process is significant, as the history of the develop-
ment of labor relations in this country over the past fifty years
demonstrates. Lobbying in the legislature and bargaining at
the table are practically inseparable. Contributions to particu-
lar candidates and supporting or opposing legislation favorable
or unfavorable to labor may be more important than negotia-
tions at the table in reaching the proper objectives of the organ-
ization. As Justice Douglas said in Street, "[tihe furtherance
of the common cause leaves some leeway for the leadership of
the group. As long as they act to promote the cause which
justified bringing the group together, the individual cannot
65. 351 U.S. at 235.
66. 367 U.S. at 768-69.
67. 431 U.S. at 236.
68. Although non-members may oppose the union itself on ideological grounds,
such opposition is not within the ambit of the proscription against forced contributions
which support political activities.
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withdraw his financial support merely because he disagrees
with the group's strategy.""5 Furthermore, under laws such as
EERA, the exclusive representative plays a central role in the
overall legislative plan designated "to promote the improve-
ment of personnel management and employer relations" within
the public school systems of the State of California" and defin-
ing permissible expenditures in line with its statutory duties
should be appropriate.
Expenditures for social activities enhance the morale of
the membership and may strengthen resolve at the bargaining.
table. Other expenditures which may not be readily catego-
rized as a representation expense but which do not have politi-
cal or ideological objectives-for example, social programs,
group legal service programs, and health and welfare benefits,
if available to non-members-should be proper expenditures.
As previously observed, the Supreme Court has upheld the
imposition of liability on non-members because they benefit
from union activities.7
It is obvious that the line between permissible and imper-
missible expenditures should be drawn to ensure that the union
can effectively carry on its collective bargaining function; oth-
erwise the decision in A bood is meaningless. To require a labor
organization to justify each and every expenditure could inter-
fere with the effectiveness of the labor organization and involve
considerable expense.
It has been suggested that the line should be limited to
those expenditures which are "essential" to that function, not
merely "helpful." 72 Accordingly, it has been proposed that
those expenditures related to the negotiation and administra-
tion of a particular contract are permissible, while those inci-
dent to negotiating or administering contracts in general or to
influencing the framework in which a particular contract is
negotiated are not.73 This proposal seems too restrictive and if
adopted could impair the union's ability to carry out its statu-
tory duties. It would also appear to require a detailed analysis
of each and every expenditure.
69. 367 U.S. at 778 (Douglas, J., concurring).
70. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540 (West Supp. 1978).
71. EERA, unlike NLRA, provides non-members with the opportunity to vote
indirectly on these matters because even though they have no right to participate in
internal union matters, they do have the right to vote on the agency fee if the employer
requests an election. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3546(a) (West Supp. 1978).
72. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 70, 197 (1977).
73. Id.
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Limiting the proscribed expenditures to those for political
candidates, political campaigns, and lobbying purposes unre-
lated to collective bargaining should satisfy the first amend-
ment interest vindicated in A bood and would avoid a wholesale
examination of every expenditure.74 It is significant to note that
in using such a standard, the amount of rebate as determined
by the California Teachers Association for 1976-77 was only
1.15% and for the National Education Association was 2.9%. 
7
The Expenditure Distinction in Other States
An examination of the law in other states which permit the
agency or fair share fee agreement reveals no uniformity but
does indicate an awareness of the problem involved in charging
non-members for political and ideological expenditures. In the
fifteen states (including the District of Columbia) in addition
to California which authorize the agency fee or fair share agree-
ment either by statute"5 or by case decision7 for some or all
74. In September 1977, the Board of Directors of the California Teachers Associa-
tion, which represents the majority of California public school teachers, adopted a
"Political Activity Rebate Procedure," according to which notice is given to all non-
members who are subject to an agency fee charge, informing them that they are
entitled to a refund of a percentage of the fee spent by the local chapter and CTA "for
political purposes not related to a labor organization's function." Letter from CTA
President Stephen H. Edwards, Jr., to Chapter Presidents (Sept. 20, 1977) (on file at
Santa Clara L. Rev.). The non-member is required to make a written request for
refund. An independent auditing firm determines what expenditures are for political
activities, and this determination is subject to review by referral to an impartial hear-
ing conducted under American Arbitration Association Rules. As an example, the
Ocean View Educator's Association defines "political activity" as "(1) the administra-
tion of the CTA's independent political action affiliate (ABC, The Association for
Better Citizenship), (2) the determination and/or publicizing of OVEA or CTA's pref-
erence for a candidate for political office, or (3) efforts to enact, defeat, repeal, or
amend legislation which is not related to the working conditions (legislation regarding
collective bargaining is deemed related to working environment of employees repre-
sented by OVEA and CTA)." OCEAN VIEW EDUCATORS AsS'N, NOTICE OF POLITICAL
ACTIVITY REBATE PROCEDURE (Feb. 1978) (on file at Santa Clara L. Rev.).
75. OCEAN VIEW EDUCATORS Ass'N, NOTICE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY REBATE
PROCEDURE, supra note 74.
76. See [1977] PuB. EMP. BARGAINING (CCH) 5515: Alaska, Connecticut, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New York City,
North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin and Vermont. ALASKA STAT. §
23.40.110 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-290 (West Supp. 1978); DIST. PERS.
MANUAL, [19771 PUa. EMP. BARGAINING (CCH) 14117; HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-2(16)
(1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 12 (West Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 423.210 (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65 (West Supp. 1978); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 59-1603(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 93-b (McKinney
1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-12-03(b)-03(f) (1972); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 243.650,
292.055 (1977-1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1722(a), 1726(a)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1977);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.122 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.81(6) (West
1974).
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public employees, there is no uniform pattern in describing
what the agency fee covers, but none permit a charge in excess
of regular dues charged members and most limit the charge to
a lesser figure. Several states specifically limit the charge to the
cost of representation, the "cost of collective bargaining," or
the cost of collective bargaining and representation and/or con-
tract administration.8 Rhode Island limits the amount to the
cost of benefits received. 8 Minnesota provides that the amount
shall not exceed the cost of regular dues less benefits which
non-members do not receive but in no event more than 85
percent of regular dues. 0 Several states limit fees to an amount
equal to the regular dues' and two states besides California do
not specify what the fee covers but do provide that it shall not
exceed regular dues. 2 Four states permit employees to contrib-
ute the fee to a charitable organization if their religious convic-
tions preclude them from joining or supporting a labor organi-
zation. "3
In Oregon, the PERB decides on the amount of the fee if
the parties cannot agree. 4 In Minnesota, the law requires that
the exclusive representative must give advance notice of the
amount of the "fair share" fee to the Director of PERB, the
employer, and the employees of the unit." This amount can be
challenged by giving timely notice, and the burden falls on the
exclusive representative to establish that the amount is appro-
priate. 6 In Massachusetts, the legislature has detailed those
costs which are not related to collective bargaining and con-
tract administration as follows: a) contributions to political
77. Town of North Kingstown v. North Kingstown Teachers Ass'n, 110 R.I. 698,
297 A.2d 342 (1972).
78. Alaska, the District of Columbia, North Dakota, and Wisconsin. ALASKA
STAT. § 23.40.110 (1977); DIST. PERS. MANUAL, [19771 PUB. EMP. BARGAINING (CCH)
14117; N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-12-03(b), (f) (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.81(6) (West
1974).
79. Town of North Kingstown v. North Kingstown Teachers Ass'n, 110 R.I. 698,
297 A.2d 342 (1972).
80. MINN. STAT. ANN. ,§ 179.65 (West Supp. 1978).
81. Michigan, Montana, Washington, and New York City (City employees only).
82. Connecticut and Vermont.
83. Alaska, Montana, Oregon, and Washington. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.225 (1977)
(the employee pays the fee and the labor organization must then contribute to a
charitable organization); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 59-1603(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977); OR.
REv. STAT. § 243.666 (1977-1978); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.56.122 (Supp. 1976).
8A OR. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BD. RULE 15-030, [1977] 2 PUB. EMP. BARGAINING
(CCH) 26966.
85. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65 (West Supp. 1978).
86. Id.
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parties or candidates for or holders of public office, b) contribu-
tions to charitable, religious or political organizations or
causes, c) fines, penalties or damages arising from the unlawful
activities of a bargaining agent or a bargaining agent's officers,
members or agents, d) social or recreational activities, e) costs
of educational activities unrelated to collective bargaining and
contract administration, f) costs of medical insurance, retire-
ment benefits or other benefit programs and, g) costs incurred
by the bargaining agent to organize employees who are not
included in the bargaining unit. 7
Two states, Massachusetts"' and Wisconsin,"9 require an
election before a service fee can be implemented. Montana
deems it an unfair practice to use any portion of the agency
shop fees for contribution toward political candidates or par-
ties"' and Vermont law specifically provides that it is unfair to
charge a fee which is "excessive or discriminatory.""
Service Fees in California: Is an Abood Violation an Unfair
Practice?
Under California law, organizational security is permitted
but not mandated. Both parties, the employer and the em-
ployee organization, must agree to include such a provision in
the collective bargaining agreement. 2 Furthermore, the em-
ployer can require that the organizational security provisions
of the contract be severed from the other provisions and sub-
mitted to unit members for separate approval by a majority
vote." Even after they have been adopted, organizational secu-
rity agreements may. be rescinded by majority vote. 4 In addi-
tion, the amount of the service fee may not exceed "the stan-
dard initiation fee, period dues, and general assessments of the
organization. ,95
PERB has not decided whether or not an unfair practice
is committed if the service fee charge is expended for impermis-
87. Massachusetts Labor Relations Code, art. IX, § 3, [1977] 2 PuB. EMP.
BARGAINING (CCH) 19547.
88. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 12 (West Supp. 1978).
89. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.81(6), -.81(13) (West 1974).
90. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59.1605 (Supp. 1977).
91. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1726(b)(6) (Supp. 1977).
92. CAL. GOV'T CODE, §§ 3540.1(1),-.1(2), 3546 (West Supp. 1978).
93. Id. § 3546(a).
94. Id. § 3546(b).
95. Id. § 3540.1(i)(2).
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sible activities." There appear to be several theories on which
an unfair charge could be predicated but it is far from clear
that any would be successful. Government Code section 3543.6,
which specifies the conduct which constitutes an unfair charge
for an employee organization, reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for an employee organization to:
(a) Cause or attempt to cause a public school employer
to violate Section 3543.5.
(b) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees,
to discriminate or threaten to discriminate against em-
ployees, or otherwise to coerce employees because of their
exercise of rights guaranteed by this chapter.
(c) Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in good faith with
a public school employer of any of the employees of which
it is the exclusive representative.
(d) Refuse to participate in good faith in the impasse
procedure set forth in Article 9 (commencing with Section
3548) .97
The only subsections upon which such an unfair practice
could be predicated are subsections (a) and (b). Neither has
been construed by PERB in this context.
Subsection (b) is.identical to section 3543.5(a) which ap-
plies to employers and has been interpreted by PERB to re-
quire an unlawful intent or improper motivation as an element
of an unfair practice charge.96 If the same interpretation is
adopted for section 3543.6(b), then an unlawful intent or im-
proper motivation would have to be established in proving an
excessive service fee. PERB would have to determine first that
an excessive fee was charged. If section 3540.1(2) is interpreted
as limiting the permissible amount of the service fee to only
those costs which are constitutionally permissible, then PERB
would have to interpret the decision in A bood and define the
constitutional limitation on a case by case basis." The disad-
vantage of adopting a dividing line which is dependent upon
constitutional construction is the uncertainty which may exist
96. King City Joint Union High School Teachers Ass'n, No. SF-CO-5 (PERB,
filed Oct. 12, 1976) (currently pending before Hearing Officer).
97. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3543.6 (West Supp. 1978).
98. San Dieguito Faculty Ass'n v. San Dieguito Union High School Dist., EERB
Decision No. 22 (Sept. 2, 1977), 11976-1977 Transfer Binder] I PuB. EMPLOYEE REP.
CAL. (LRP) 369.
99. This should not prevent PERB from considering unfair practice charges
based upon discrimination alleged to exist because service fees in differing amounts
are charged members of the same unit.
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until the constitutional line is finally drawn by the Supreme
Court. This consideration may militate against PERB holding
that an excessive service fee is an unfair practice until a more
definitive rule has been announced by the Supreme Court. 0
The refusal of PERB to entertain unfairs on Abood-type
allegations does not leave non-members without a remedy. The
types of conduct which the EERA deems unfair are those for
which there are no other remedies available at law. Because the
state or federal courts are available to enforce Abood-type vio-
lations, the refusal of PERB to entertain that type of case as
an unfair practice charge would not leave non-members with-
out a remedy. In view of the necessity of establishing an impro-
per motivation as an element of an unfair practice it could be
further argued that if an employee organization has adopted an
internal procedure, similar to the one mentioned in A bood and
adopted by the California Teachers Association, and if that
procedure included a determination by an impartial arbitrator,
then PERB could rule that no unfair practice was committed
if the employee organization complied with the decision of the
arbitrator.
Under the NLRA and some other state laws which make
it an unfair practice to charge excessive fees, there is a statu-
tory standard for the administrative body to follow. It is the
author's opinion that in the absence of legislation expressly
making an Abood-type violation an unfair practice, PERB
should not entertain this type of case as an unfair.
PROBLEMS IN ENFORCING THE COLLECTION OF SERVICE FEES
In addition to the problem of determining permissible ex-
penditures for which the service fee may be used, the enforce-
ment or collection of the fee may create certain difficulties,
especially in the field of educational employment. The EERA
states that both the maintenance-of-membership and service
fee arrangements shall constitute "a condition of continued
employment,""'" but it is doubtful that a teacher could be dis-
missed for failure to pay either fee.
In the private sector, under the NLRA, it is well estab-
lished that the failure to pay the fee is grounds for dismissal.'2
100. Shealor v. Lodi, 23 Cal. 2d 647, 145 P.2d 594 (1944); Palermo v. Stockton
Theaters, Inc., 32 Cal. 2d 53, 195 P.2d 1 (1948).
101. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3540.1(i)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
102. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
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However, unlike the private sector, many public employees
have established rights under civil service or tenure laws which
predated the current era of collective bargaining. These rights
are well defined and long standing. The inter-relationship be-
tween the collective bargaining laws and tenure laws is a very
important and as yet unresolved area of law. Consequently, it
is far from clear that a teacher can be dismissed from employ-
ment for non-payment of the agency fee.
In the only two reported cases involving the conflict be-
tween other statutes and collective bargaining laws, both state
courts have held that an employee could not be dismissed. The
Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that a school district em-
ployer could not be compelled to negotiate a contract provision
giving probationary teachers the right to grieve their termina-
tion because "[iln providing a process for dismissal and non-
renewal of contract, the legislature has balanced the various
interests involved in order to protect not only teachers but the
public interest in insuring the children are well taught.'
0 3
Thus, since the law vested in the district the power to termi-
nate probationary teachers without cause, such a provision was
not subject to collective bargaining.10A Pennsylvania court set aside an arbitration award which
directed an employer to dismiss a teacher for failure to pay
dues under a maintenance-of-membership agreement.0 5 Penn-
sylvania, like California, has a statute which provides that ten-
ured teachers can be terminated only for specific grounds enu-
merated in the statute. 0 The arbitrator ruled that this statute
did not apply, but the court reversed the ruling on the grounds
that the collective bargaining law provided that a collective
bargaining agreement shall not violate, be inconsistent with, or
conflict with any other statute.'0 6.' The court held that the
103. Superintending School Comm. of the Town of Winslow v. Winslow Educ.
Ass'n, 363 A.2d 229, 234 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1976).
104. Id. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20, § 161(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977) was amended to
provide that "just cause" for dismissal was a proper subject of negotiation for tenured
teachers.
105. Dauphin County Technical School Educ. Ass'n v. School Bd., 24 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 639, 357 A.2d 721 (1976). See also Commonwealth Labor Relations Bd.
v. Uniontown Area School Dist., 28 Pa. Commonw. Ct. 61, 367 A.2d 738 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1977).
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122 (Purdon 1962).
106.1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Purdon Supp. 1978) reads as follows:
The parties to the collective bargaining process shall not effect or imple-
ment a provision of a collective bargaining agreement if the implementa-
ti6n of that provision would be in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in
conflict with any statute or statutes enacted by the General Assembly of
1978] 929
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provision for maintenance-of-membership in the agreement
was inconsistent with the tenure law. The court distinguished
an earlier case which upheld a collective bargaining agreement
in which a school district agreed to submit to arbitration the
propriety of dismissing a non-tenured teacher. 7 These cases
indicate a reluctance on the part of the courts to interfere with
established tenure systems in the absence of a clear mandate
from the legislature to do so.
The California Tenure System
In California, the legislature has specifically stated in the
EERA that the Act shall not supersede "other provisions of the
Education Code . ..which establish and regulate tenure
.... Pi"0 In California, the grounds for dismissal of tenured
teachers are enumerated in the tenure law, and those grounds
do not include dismissal for non-payment of an agency or serv-
ice fee. 0 The California Education Code provides"' and our
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or the provisions of municipal home
rule charters.
107. 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 642, 357 A.2d at 724 (distinguishing Board of Educ.
v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, 464 Pa. 92, 346 A.2d 35 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1975).
108. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540 (West Supp. 1978) provides, in relevant part:
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to supersede other provisions
of the Education Code and the rules and regulations of public school
employers which establish and regulate tenure or a merit or civil service
system or which provide for other methods of administering employer-
employee relations, so long as the rules and regulations or other methods
of the public school employer do not conflict with lawful collective agree-
ments.
109. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44932, 87732 (West Special Pamphlet pts. I & II 1978).
Duplicate reference is made because the Education Code has been recently revised
separating provisions for the districts maintaining grades K-12, id. §§ 33000-60672, and
the Community Colleges, id. §§ 66000-99127.
110. Id. § 44932 provides:
No permanent employee shall be dismissed except for one or more of the
following causes: (a) Immoral or unprofessional conduct. (b) Commis-
sion, aiding, or advocating the commission of acts of criminal syndical-
ism, as prohibited by Chapter 188, Statutes of 1919, or in any amendment
thereof. (c) Dishonesty. (d) Incompetency. (e) Evident unfitness for serv-
ice. (f) Physical or mental condition unfitting him to instruct or associate
with children. (g) Persistent violation of or refusal to obey the school laws
of the state or reasonable regulations prescribed for the government of the
public schools by the State Board of Education or by the governing board
of the school district employing him. (h) Conviction of a felony or of any
crime involving moral turpitude. (i) Violation of Section 51530 of this
code or conduct specified in Section 1028 of the Government Code, added
by Chapter 1418 of the Statutes of 1947. (j) Violation of any provision in
Sections 7001 to 7007, inclusive, of this code. (k) Knowing membership
by the employee in the Communist Party.
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courts have heldII' that tenured teachers may be dismissed only
for specified statutory grounds. The California Supreme Court
has held that if dismissal is based on "immoral or unprofes-
sional conduct" and "evident unfitness for service," the deter-
minative test is "fitness to teach."" 2 In addition to the proce-
dures for dismissal, the legislature has required every school
district to have a uniform system of evaluation of all profes-
sional personnel." 3
Moreover, both tenured"4 and non-tenured"5 teachers are
entitled to an administrative hearing to determine whether
grounds exist for their dismissal. The decision of the Commis-
sion on Professional Competence which hears tenured dis-
missal cases is final and binding on the school district."6 The
decision of the administrative law judge in non-tenured dis-
missal is not binding but is subject to the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act."7 Finally, tenured teachers are
entitled to an independent review in the superior court."'
It appears, therefore, that Government Code section 3540
manifests a legislative intent not to change or modify the exist-
ing comprehensive tenure system. Thus, although the tenure
system is a creation of the legislature and may be modified by
the legislature," 9 that body has shown no intent to do so. While
it could be argued that failure to pay the agency fee constitutes
insubordination and a persistent violation or refusal to obey
school laws (a statutory ground for dismissal),'20 it is probable
111. Governing Bd. of Oakdale Union School Dist. v. Seaman, 28 Cal. App. 3d
77, 104 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1972).
112. Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 696, 566 P.2d 602, 604, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 700, 702 (1977).
113. CAL. EDUC. CODE § § 44660 and 87660 (West Special Pamphlets I & II 1978).
114. Id. § 44944.
115. Id. § 44949.
116. Id. § 44944.
117. Id. § 44949.
118. Id. § 44945.
119. Taylor v. Board of Educ., 31 Cal. App. 2d 734, 89 P.2d 148 (1939). Cf.
Governing Board of the Chaffey Union High School District v. Commission on Profes-
sional Competence, 72 Cal. App. 3d 447, 140 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1977). In Taylor the court
said, "In California ..., the legislature still has plenary power over teacher tenure,
there being no constitutional provisions in any way limiting that power." Id. at 744,
89 P.2d at 153. It has been held under one state law that adding additional grounds
for dismissal that changed the tenure law impaired a contract protected by the federal
constitution. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
120. Cf. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44932(g) and 87732(g) (West Special Pamphlets I
& 11 1978) (statutory grounds for dismissal of permanent school district and commu-
nity college district employees). See also Stuart v. Board of Educ., 161 Cal. 210, 118
P. 712 (1911); Governing Bd. of Oakdale Union School Dist. v. Seaman, 28 Cal. App.
3d 77, 104 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1972).
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that California courts will hold, in view of the specific language
of section 3540, that the legislature did not intend to include
non-payment as a basis for dismissal on that statutory ground.
Probationary teachers do not have a vested right to em-
ployment.'' There are no enumerated grounds for dismissal,
but the cause must relate solely "to the welfare of the schools
and the pupils thereof."' 2 Whether probationary teachers can
be dismissed for non-payment is less clear. In the cases cited
from other states, a distinction was made between tenured and
non-tenured employees,' 3 but in both Maine and Pennsyl-
vania, there apparently was no statutory restriction on termi-
nating non-tenured teachers. This is not true in California.
In California, non-tenured teachers can be terminated "for
cause only." It has been held that whether particular conduct
established cause for dismissal of a non-tenured teacher is a
"pure question of law."'2 4 Thus, although the language of sec-
tion 3540 refers to "tenure or a merit or civil service system"
and arguably not to non-tenured employees,' 5 the substantial
protections that the legislature has given non-tenured teachers
may be sufficient to convince a court that the legislature did
not intend to give districts the authority to terminate non-
tenured teachers for non-payment of dues.
In conclusion, it appears probable that neither tenured nor
non-tenured employees may be dismissed for non-payment of
a service fee or a maintenance-of-membership fee. Even if it
were held otherwise, the exclusive representative has no legal
authority to commence a dismissal proceeding. Since this au-
thority is vested in the exclusive control of the school district,
the employee organization would probably have to bring a suit
in superior court' 6 or perhaps file an unfair practice charge
against the district.'"
121. Turner v. Board of Trustees, 16 Cal. 3d 818, 548 P.2d 1115, 129 Cal. Rptr.
443 (1976).
122. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44949(d) (West Special Pamphlet 11978).
123. See note 105 supra.
124. Lindros v. Governing Bd. of Torrance Unified School Dist., 9 Cal. 3d 524,
534, 510 P.2d 361, 367, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185, 191 (1973).
125. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3540 (West Supp. 1978).
126. PERB does not have jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments, but may consider the same conduct if it also constitutes an unfair practice. CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 3541.5(b) (West Supp. 1978).
127. One employee organization filed an unfair practice charge against a school
district employer for failure to discharge non-paying members, but the court held there
was no unfair because dismissal for non-payment was not lawful. Commonwealth
Labor Relations Bd. v. Uniontown Area School Dist., 28 Pa. Commonw. Ct. 61, 367
A.2d 738 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
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Alternative Methods of Enforcement of Service Fees
Assuming that dismissal for non-payment is not legally
permissible, an alternative method of enforcement would be to
provide in the collective bargaining agreement that the em-
ployer withhold the agency fee on a monthly basis in the same
manner as association dues are payroll-deducted. In Hawaii,
the law specifically provides for automatic deductions once the
exclusive representative is designated, with or without a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.' It is uncertain whether such a
provision is authorized in California. Government Code section
3543.1(d) provides that the exclusive representative has the
right to dues deductions "pursuant to Sections 13532 and
13604.2 of the Education Code."'2 9 These sections of the Educa-
tion Code provide for voluntary authorization by the employee
for dues deduction, which authorization is specifically made
revocable upon written notice from the employee. In view of the
specific reference to these provisions, it is doubtful that an
employer can agree to deduct a service fee or dues without
written authorization from the non-member. Presumably that
authorization would not be forthcoming. Both the EERA and
the Education Code sections referred to above speak only of
dues and not of agency or service fees. It is unclear, therefore,
whether service fees could be withheld by agreement withouit
the consent of the non-member. Such an agreement is certainly
not inconsistent with the EERA, and a bargained-for agree-
ment would be in accord with the objective of enforcing the
obligation of non-members to pay their fair share. On the other
hand, it might seem anomalous that an agreement could re-
quire involuntary deductions for the service fee and not for
dues. Involuntary deduction from wages does not appear to be
a promising method of collecting service fees.
A third method of enforcement would be an action directly
against an employee in the state court. Such actions would be
time consuming and expensive.' 3 The theory on which such
128. Under Hawaiian law, all members of the unit are charged a service fee and
dues and assessments are treated separately. Upon a written statement from the ex-
clusive representative, the employer must withhold the amount requested. HAw. REv.
STAT. § 89-13 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.122 (Supp. 1976).
129. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.1(d) (West Supp. 1978); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 45060,
87833 (West Special Pamphlets I & 111978) (certified employees); id. §§ 45168, 88167
(classified employees).
130. To reduce the cost, small claims court could be used. Jurisdiction extends
to any actions "for the recovery of money" where the demand does not exceed $750.00.
CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 116.2 (West Supp. 1978).
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actions could be based would be either the enforcement of a
statutory obligation or unjust enrichment.'31 While it is estab-
lished that employees covered by a collective bargaining con-
tract are entitled to sue as third party beneficiaries and that
even a non-member may sue,' neither the employee organiza-
tion nor the employer are third party beneficiaries. A third
party beneficiary is a person for whom the contract is made and
who under our law can bring suit in his own name even though
not a promisor. An action to enforce payment of a service fee
presents the reverse situation.'33
The Problem of Retroactivity in Collection of Service Fees
There is still another issue that may arise in litigation to
enforce the agency fee. If the collective bargaining agreement
were not executed until some time after the beginning of the
contract year, it may be argued that the agency fee cannot be
made retroactive even if the contract benefits such as wages,
are made retroactive. Under the NLRA, it has been held that
the union dues cannot be collected retroactively,'34 but this
ruling is based on the particular language of the NLRA. The
EERA does not specify whether the recovery of the service fee
may be made retroactive. However, unlike the NLRA which
specifies a thirty-day grace period, the EERA provides that the
service fee shall be payable for the "duration of the agree-
131. 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Contracts § 5, at 32 (8th ed. 1973).
No action would seem to lie in quasi-contract because normally it must appear that
the benefits were conferred by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Id. at 49.
132. Leahy v. Smith, 137 Cal. App. 2d 884, 290 P.2d 679 (1955).
133. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1559 (West 1954).
134. Colonie Fibre Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 589, 18 L.R.R.M. 1256, modified, 71
N.L.R.B. 354, 18 L.R.R.M. 1500 (1946), enforced, Colonie Fibre Co. v. NLRB, 163 F.2d
65 (2d Cir. 1947) [hereinafter Colonie Fibre Co.]. This case involved the enforce-
ment of a maintenance of membership agreement, but the rationale would apply at
least as strongly to the agency shop. In Kress Dairy, Inc., 98 N.L.R.B. 369, 29 L.R.R.M.
1348 (1952), a representation case, the NLRB stated the purpose and effect of the
thirty-day grace period:
In writing the 30-day grace period into Section 8 (a)(3), the Congress
clearly intended to assure that all non-members of a union who were
employed when a union-security contract was executed, and all employ-
ees employed thereafter, should have 30 days in which to join the union.
It is fundamental, therefore, that the statutory 30 days must be counted
prospectively from the date of execution of a union-security contract. A
contrary holding would allow unions and employers to defeat the congres-
sional purpose, at least in part, by pre-dating by 30 days every contract
containing a union-security clause.
Id. at 370, 18 L.R.R.M. at 1348.
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ment."'3 S This fact is significant because the legislature was
presumably aware of the NLRA and case law interpreting it. 131
Furthermore, section 3540.1(i)(1), dealing with maintenance-
of-membership agreements, refers to a thirty-day grace period
after the expiration of the contract during which an employee
may terminate membership. The failure to require the thirty-
day grace period at the inception of the agreement surely estab-
lished the legality of the imposition of the agency fee from at
least the execution of the agreement.
A careful analysis of the case 37 on which the NLRA rule
of non-retroactivity is based indicates that membership re-
troactivity was applied during a period when there was no ex-
clusive representative. It appears reasonable to preclude re-
troactivity in that situation because (1) an employee may be a
member of the losing union and in effect may pay a service
charge to both, and (2) the service charge is related to collective
bargaining expenditures, and since there was no exclusive rep-
resentative, there was no collective bargaining. On the other
hand, where the union has been certified as the exclusive repre-
sentative, it seems appropriate to apply retroactivity to the
effective date of the teacher's contract unless the law specifi-
cally provides otherwise. As the authorities previously cited
indicate, the principal purpose and justification for imposing
the agency fee on non-members is to require all members of the
bargaining unit to pay their fair share cost of union activities
from which they benefit. When the collective bargaining agree-
ment provides for higher wages and more extensive fringe bene-
fits retroactive to the beginning of the contract year, there is
no reason why the service fee should not also be retroactive. If
the service fee can be charged only for the period from the date
of execution of the collective bargaining agreement to its termi-
nation, there may be many cases in which non-members will
not be paying their fair share. Some collective bargaining
agreements have taken up to ten months to negotiate. 38 School
employees do not have the right to strike. Thus, an exclusive
representative might be placed in the position of accepting an
unfavorable agreement early to avoid losing substantial reve-
135. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3450.1(i)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
136. Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 507 (1974).
137. Colonie Fibre Co., supra note 134.
138. Los Altos Teachers Ass'n, No. SF-CO-30, -31, -32 77/78 (Hearing Officer's
Proposed Decision Sept. 6, 1978).
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nue from service fees it would be entitled to collect if the execu-
tion of contract date is applicable.
CONCLUSION
Even though the agency fee, per se, is legal in the public
sector, there are many unresolved issues, including the legality
of expenditures from such fees and the difficulty in enforcing
such provisions, especially in the field of education. Until these
issues are resolved by the courts and the legislature, the utility
of the agency fee depends largely upon the extent to which the
non- members object to the fee and contest its payment. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has provided a starting point in
A bood, and in time workable solutions will undoubtedly be
achieved, eliminating the "free-rider" once and for all.
